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Brave New Workplace: Genetic Discrimination
I. Introduction
Mary Spencer was rejected for a job
because she carries the gene linked to
breast cancer.  Mary's case is not
unusual.1   A Georgetown University
survey of people with genes linked to
diseases such as breast cancer and
Alzheimer's found that 13 percent had
been fired because of their condition.2
Humanity has only known about
the existence of genetics since the 19th
century, when Austrian scientist
Gregor Mendel, through his experi-
ments with plants, proved that certain
traits were inherited.  But, it wasn't
until 1953 that Francis Crick, James
Watson, and Maurice Wilkens discov-
ered the structure of the DNA
molecule, for which they won the Nobel
Prize.3    In 2003, the Human Genome
Project (a $3 billion dollar federal
research program) had identified all
25,000 genes in the human body.4
Along the way, we learned that
certain genes are linked to specific
diseases  For example, a person who
carries the gene linked to Huntington's
disease is certain to get the disease and
die from it.  There is no prevention, no
cure, and no escape.  In most cases, the
connection is more complex and the
outcome less certain.  Most women
who carry one of the two genes linked
to breast cancer will not develop the
disease and most women who develop
breast cancer do not carry either gene.
But women who carry these genes are
almost twice as likely to develop breast
cancer as those who do not.5
Genes linked to Alzheimer's, ALS
(Lou Gehrig's disease), cystic fibrosis,
hemophilia, sickle cell disease, Tay-
Sachs, and many other diseases have
also been identified.6  In all, 35 genes
with links to specific diseases have
been identified, and more are
constantly being discovered.  Technol-
ogy has developed that can determine
the presence  of many of these genes in
particular individuals.
In the long run, this knowledge
could be a blessing.  The first step to
finding a cure for any disease is
learning about how it is contracted.
Bill Frist, the former Republican
Senate Majority Leader and a
physician, says that "research involv-
ing the human genome may open
doors to new methods of medical
diagnoses and treatment – to a new
practice of medicine involving drugs
designed for specific genes, genetically
engineered organs for use in trans-
plants, or even preventative care
based  on genetic testing."7
Immediate implications of these
genetic breakthroughs, however, are
anything but benevolent. Most Ameri-
cans get their medical insurance
through their employers. Employers
who pay for much of our medical care
have a financial incentive to keep the
costs down.
In recent years, the cost of medical
care has soared  We now spend $2.4
trillion a year on health care,
consuming 17 percent of our gross
domestic product.8  Health care costs
are increasing twice as fast as
inflation.  Over the next ten years,
medical costs are projected to reach
$4.3 trillion.9
Employers have been hit hard by
these escalating costs.  In the last ten
years, annual health insurance pre-
miums have increased 120 percent.10
It now costs an employer $12,700 a
year to provide health insurance for an
employee with a family and $4,700 for
a single employee.11  General Motors
spends more on health care than it
does for the steel from which it makes
cars.12  Employers sometimes cry wolf
about costs, but the unending spiral of
increasing medical costs is a real
problem.
Employers have tried everything
they can think of to reduce medical
costs.  They put employees into HMO
and other managed care plans.  Health
care experts had high hopes for this
new approach, but costs kept going up.
Employers also increased co-
payments.The average co-pay is now
$3,400, up 12 percent in a single
year.13 This imposed hardship on
many families.  A Harvard University
study found that 50 percent of all
bankruptcy filings were the result of
medical debt.14   But cost shifting has
not solved employers' problem; the
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costs are too high to shift to employees.
Then employers began to think, "If
we can't hold down the cost of health
care, let's hire people who will need
less of it." Employers could save
money by finding out which applicants
are likely to have high medical costs
and not hiring them (even if they are
the best qualified).
This wasn't hard to do. Many
companies were already conducting
pre-employment medical evaluations.
One goal of such programs was to
determine whether employees were
capable of performing the jobs for
which they had been tentatively
selected.  Many people have medical
conditions or limitations that are
invisible or that they don't know
about.  For example, many people's
backs are incapable of accepting the
strain of a job that involves heavy
lifting.  If one of these people is hired for
the wrong job, he or she could be
seriously injured and the employer
would face a workers compensation
claim for medical bills and lost wages.
The other primary goal of pre-
employment physicals is to avoid
paying for medical care for "pre-
existing conditions."  Many health
insurance plans cover only injuries
and illnesses that occur after the
beneficiary becomes insured. In prac-
tice, however, it can be difficult to
determine when a person acquired a
disease that was diagnosed today.  If
an employee had the condition when
hired, but the employer can't prove it,
the employer has to pay. By conduct-
ing a pre-employment medical exami-
nation, the company knows which
medical conditions the employee had
the first day on the job. Today, 68
percent of companies have pre-
employment medical evaluations. 15
The same medical exam that can
meet these two goals can also reveal
whether an employee has a condition
that could lead to high medical
bills. The list of such conditions is
almost endless: diabetes, heart dis-
ease, psychiatric conditions, even
pregnancy (the Washington D.C.
police department was caught con-
ducting secret pregnancy tests of all
female applicants and rejected all
women who tested positive).16   With
the breakthroughs in genetic technol-
ogy, finding out whether an individual
carries a gene linked to an expensive
disease can be added to the list.  The
Congressional Office of Technology
Assessment found that approximately
4 percent of American employers
conduct genetic tests of employees or
applicants.17   This finding was based
on a survey of 330 Fortune 500
companies.18
A.  Secret Genetic Screening
Employees may never know if they
have been genetically tested because
the  same blood sample that is taken
for other purposes can be used to
conduct genetic tests. For example,
Lawrence Berkeley Laboratories, a
division of the University of Califor-
nia, secretly tested job applicants for
the gene linked to sickle cell anemia
and refused to hire anyone who tested
positive.19
Employers can acquire genetic
information without conducting tests.
Many people with family histories of
genetically linked illnesses choose to
be tested privately for purposes such
as family planning. Their tests results
become part of their permanent
medical records. In a  pre-employment
physical, a company doctor reviews
the applicant's medical file. This
review is not limited to information
that is job related; the entire medical
file is reviewed.  This unlimited review
alone is an invasion of privacy.  Worse
yet, this unlimited medical review
could cost a person the job. An
applicant who has tested positive for a
gene linked to disease may not be
hired, but will not know why because
employers are not required to inform
applicants why they are not hired and
virtually none do.
Family history is also part of most
medical records.  Even for a person
who has never had a genetic test,
family medical history can reveal a lot
about probable genetics.  For example,
a woman whose grandmother and
mother both died of breast cancer has
a good chance of carrying the gene.
While it is only a probability, little
more is often needed to lose a job,
especially when there are many other
applicants.
  Sometimes employers get genetic
information without collecting any
medical information. For example,
Christine DeMark, a sales representa-
tive with an exemplary record, was
fired when her employer found out that
she was at risk for Huntington's
disease.  She was never tested for the
Huntington's gene. But when a
relative came down with Huntington's,
something her employer knew nothing
about, DeMark was concerned she
might have the gene too and was
considering being tested.
A positive test result for the
Huntington's disease gene is a death
sentence.  It's a great relief to those
who test negative to learn they are
safe.  But it is traumatic for those who
test positive. People considering test-
ing for the Huntington's gene are
required to undergo counseling to
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human rights in the workplace. Prior
to becoming an independent organiza-
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make sure it is something for which
they are truly prepared. DeMark
mentioned to a co-worker she thought
was her friend that she had started the
counseling. DeMark never told her
employer, but her "friend" did. Her
boss immediately fired her.20
B.  Betting Your Life
Many people who know they are at
risk of carrying a disease-linked gene
decide not to be tested because they are
afraid employers will find out and
discriminate against them. Not get-
ting tested may eliminate this risk,
but it creates others. With some
diseases, those who know they are at
increased genetic risk can take steps
to reduce the risk. For example,
women who carry BRCA1 or BRCA2
(linked to breast cancer) can have
mammograms more often, or even
have mastectomies if they want to be
completely safe at any price.  When
people decide not to be tested to avoid
discrimination, they generally do not
take these preventive measures.
Detecting breast cancer early greatly
increases the chances of survival.
Many people have lost their lives
because they did not take precautions.
If they had been able to get tested
without fear of discrimination, many
of them would be alive today.
Ironically, genetic testing does not
really save money. It all amounts to
just passing the buck.  The people who
are going to develop breast cancer or
Alzheimer's still get sick and need
medical care, for which payment is
still needed.  The only change is that
employees lose opportunities to have
careers while they are still healthy
and society loses the benefit of the con-
tributions they could have made.  Even
employers may not save money.  If the
people who contract genetic diseases do
not have medical insurance, the
government will ultimately have to
pay for their care, increasing  taxes for
everyone, including employers.
C.  Good Genetic Testing
Some genetic testing helps employ-
ees. One example is genetic monitor-
ing. Instead of keeping people out of the
workplace, genetic monitoring is
designed to help keep people in the
workplace healthy.  Some jobs create
the risk of harmful genetic mutations.
For example, exposure to x-rays can
cause genetic mutations in sperm cells
that make men unable to have
children.  In most cases, the harm is
either invisible or there are no
symptoms until it is too late.
Employers in this situation often
conduct genetic tests of workers to find
out whether and when mutations are
starting to occur, so affected workers
can be moved to a different job before
they are harmed.
The other type of potentially helpful
genetic testing involves people who are
at elevated risk of harm in specific
jobs.  When an employer refuses to hire
people because they carry the gene
linked to cancer or another disease, no
one is any safer.  The applicants are
not less likely to get sick because the
employer did not hire them; they are
no more likely to get cancer if they
work in an office than if they work in
a grocery store. The employer is just
shifting the costs to the employee and
society.
But there are rare situations in
which a person who carries a
particular gene is at greater risk doing
certain jobs than everyone else. For
example, everyone who is exposed to
beryllium is at risk of contracting
chronic beryllium disease, a poten-
tially fatal pulmonary disease. But
people who carry a rare gene are at
much greater risk. In cases like this,
the risk of employee health is
decreased by not hiring people who
carry this gene to work in beryllium
plants.
D.  Who Decides?
When a genetic test shows that an
employee will be safer by not taking a
particular job, there are almost always
tradeoffs. The employer may not have
another job to offer an employee who is
beginning to have genetic mutations.
An alternative job may not pay as well.
The alternative to working in a
beryllium plant may be flipping
hamburgers for minimum wage and
the employee may have children to
support.
These are agonizing choices. The
least an employer can do in such cases
is let employees decide for themselves
whether to take the risk. The
beryllium industry testing program
works this way. The testing is
conducted by the University of Penn-
sylvania Medical School.  Test results
are given directly to the employee, who
then decides whether she wants the job
or not.  The employer never learns the
test results.21
Some employers, however, auto-
matically keep people at increased risk
out of the job in question. These
employers probably mean well, but
their paternalism is misplaced. If
employees need the benefits of the job
badly enough to take the risk, keeping
them out of the job only makes their
difficult situation worse.  Competent
adults should be able to decide for
themselves what risks to take.
Employers argue that the employee
is not taking all of the risk.  If the
employee takes (or keeps) the risky job
and becomes ill, the employer will have
to pay the worker's compensation
claim.  Under worker's compensation,
employers must pay the medical
expenses and lost wages (up to a cap) of
anyone who is injured or becomes sick
on the job regardless of fault.
This is not unfair to employers.
While employees automatically get
compensation when they are hurt on
the job, they only receive compensa-
tion for their medical expenses and lost
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pay (and sometimes an additional
payment for a permanent injury such
as loss of a limb).  But workers cannot
sue their employer, even if they can
prove that the employer was negligent.
The legal bargain is that, in exchange
for giving all injured employees some
compensation, employees who were
hurt by their employer’s negligence
give up most of their claim.
Because workers compensation
works this way, employers’ claim that
the employee isn’t taking all the risk
when they work in environment in
which they are more likely to become
sick than the average person. In
situations like this, there is no perfect
answer. The fairest thing to do is allow
the person who is taking the most risk
to make the decision. Since the
employee’s risk of death or serious
illness is greater than the employer’s
financial risk, the employee should
make the decision.
II.  Legal Protection Prior to
GINA
Genetic discrimination has been legal
for many years.  The primary defense
against discrimination based on a
medical condition is the Americans
with Disabilities Act ("ADA"), a federal
law passed in 1990.22 The ADA
protects people with disabilities from
job discrimination. If a disability
keeps a person from being able to do
the job, an employer can turn him or
her down.  But if the disability does not
interfere with job performance, em-
ployers cannot consider it when
deciding whether to hire.
In some areas, the ADA goes quite
far.  Employers are prohibited from
asking applicants about their medical
conditions and how they might affect
the  ability to do the job until they
make a "conditional job offer."23   This
means that the applicant has the job as
long as the pre-employment medical
evaluation does not turn up something
that interferes with the ability to do
the job.24
A.  The ADA's Limitations
To be protected by the ADA, an
employee must be "disabled."  To be
disabled, a person must have "a
physical or mental impairment that
substantially limits one or more major
life activities."25  People who carry a
gene linked to a disease, but not the
disease itself, are at increased risk of
becoming disabled in the future, but
they are not disabled now.  Since they
are not presently disabled, they are not
protected.
The ADA also protects people who
are "regarded as" disabled.26 This
provision was intended to prevent the
absurd conclusion that it would be
illegal to refuse to hire diabetics, but
legal for an employer to turn someone
down because the employer errone-
ously thought he or she had diabetes.
Disability rights advocates argued
that the "regarded as" clause in the
ADA would prevent genetic discrimi-
nation. Some felt so strongly about
their position that they would not
support legislation specifically ban-
ning genetic discrimination because
such legislation implied that the ADA
did not apply. Others, including the
National Workrights Institute
("NWI"), said this was a false hope.
NWI argued that an employer who will
not hire people with genetic markers
does not "perceive" them to be disabled
today.27  The employer knows perfectly
well that their abilities are not limited
in any way. The employer does not
want to hire them because they are
likely to cost the company more for
medical care in the future.
This debate regarding genetic
discrimination became contentious.
Finally, the Supreme Court settled it.
The Court did not rule on the coverage
of genetics under the ADA.  Rather, it
issued a series of decisions that
construed the Act very narrowly.  For
example, in the Sutton case, the Court
held that an employee who was legally
blind was not disabled because she
could see when she wore glasses.28
The writing was now on the wall.  A
court that would say a legally blind
person was not disabled would never
accept the  "regarded as" disabled
theory.29
III.  The Road To Reform
The road to reform started in 1990.
Several members of Congress asked
the Congressional Office of Technol-
ogy Assessment (OTA) to consider
the legal and social implications for
the then embryonic, but emerging,
breakthroughs in genetics.
OTA assembled a high-powered
and diverse group of experts to
consider the issue.  It included
Professor Mark Rothstein (now
head of the Institute for Bioethics,
Health Policy, and Law at Louis-
ville University), a nationally
recognized leader in this field,
Thomas Murray, the esteemed
bioethicist from the Hastings
Institute, and Bruce Karrh, the
head of occupational safety and
health at Dupont. I had the
privilege of being part of this group
as the representative of the ACLU,
to provide a civil rights perspective.
Even at this early stage, anyone
with vision could see the potential
consequences for genetic discrimi-
nation and the need for new legal
protection.  The OTA report called
on Congress to take action to
prevent these problems.30  Unfortu-
nately, Congress did not act.
A.  States Take the Lead
Some states acted to fill this void.
Twenty-nine states enacted laws to
prevent genetic discrimination by
employers. Many of these laws,
however, are seriously flawed.  For
example, Florida's statute applies
only to genetic information acquired
through laboratory testing; it does
not cover genetic information
obtained through review of medical
5
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records.31 Florida employers can
acquire genetic information from
applicants' medical files and use it
against them without violating the
law.  Other states, such as Texas, ban
genetic discrimination, but do not
prevent employers from acquiring
genetic information.32 Such laws are
of very little use.  Given the amount of
money an employer may save by
refusing to hire someone who carries
the "wrong" gene, many employers
will choose to discriminate where they
have genetic information, even if it is
illegal. Expecting employers to delib-
erately hire people who may turn out to
be medical liabilities is completely
naïve.
As more states enacted laws,
Congress began to pay attention.  In
1995, the Genetic Information Nondis-
crimination Act (GINA) was intro-
duced into Congress.33  This is a
common pattern in employment law.
Many other federal statutes, such as
the Employee Polygraph Protection
Act (which generally outlaws poly-
graphs in the private sector)34  have
started in the states. Trickle-up
politics, unlike trickle-down econom-
ics, is frequently effective.
B.  Employer Reaction
Employers vigorously opposed GINA,
and some of their arguments were
legitimate. For example, employers
noted that ADA enforcement begins
with a complaint to the Equal
Employment Opportunities Commis-
sion.35 There are prescribed maxi-
mum penalties, which vary with the
size of the employer.36 The maximum
penalty for the largest employers is
$300,000.37  GINA, however, allowed
employees to skip the EEOC and go
directly to court, where a jury could
award virtually unlimited damages.
Employers argued that GINA's en-
forcement system and penalties
should be consistent with other
disability discrimination statutes.
NWI agreed and eventually convinced
GINA's other supporters to change the
bill.
 Other objections were nonsensical.
The one we heard most often is, "There
aren't very many cases of genetic
discrimination.  We don't need a law
against it." This was factually incor-
rect.  While most employers didn't
practice genetic discrimination, the
ones that did affected a significant
number of people. The surveys dis-
cussed earlier consistently showed
that thousands of people had been the
victims of genetic discrimination.
Even if they had been right on the
facts, employers would still have been
wrong to oppose GINA. Their approach
would require Congress to sit around
doing nothing until the problem was so
severe that legislation was essential.
In the meantime, thousands of people
would have suffered. Congress is
frequently slow to recognize and act on
problems.  Congress should be praised,
not criticized, where it reacts quickly.
It took 13 years before Congress
finally passed GINA in May of 2008.38
Some of the delay resulted from the
need to educate members of Congress
about the issue.  Some of it came from
Congress' need to deal with other
issues, some of which were truly more
pressing.  But most of the delay came
from the resistance of the employer
and insurance lobbies, which spent a
small fortune fighting GINA.
There was no magic moment at
which GINA won Congress' support.
The Coalition for Genetic Fairness, a
group of 250 organizations working
together to support GINA, just kept
working.39 (NWI's legal director, Jer-
emy Gruber, was the driving force in
organizing the Coalition.)  So did
GINA's sponsors, led by Ted Kennedy
in the Senate and Lois Slaughter in the
House.  Every session of Congress, the
Coalition picked up a few more
supporters. In 2004, GINA passed the
Senate 98 to 0.40
But the House of Representatives
wouldn't go along. The House Majority
Leader during this time was Tom
Delay, a right wing extremist from
Texas. The Coalition kept working,
convincing one member at a time that
genetic discrimination was wrong.
Eventually, enough Republicans sup-
ported GINA that it passed the House
in 2008.41   A great deal of credit for this
belongs to Congresswoman Judith
Biggert, a Republican who became a
co-sponsor in 2005 and convinced
many of her Republican colleagues to
join her.42 It also helped that Con-
gressman Delay in 2006 was forced to
leave office after having been indicted
for violation of campaign finance laws.43
But just as it seemed like we had
won, we were blindsided.  Because the
House passed GINA in a different
session of Congress than the Senate, it
had to go back to the Senate.  Everyone
involved thought this was a formality,
since the Senate had passed GINA 98
to 0 the previous session. Then,
Senator Tom Coburn, a Republican
from Oklahoma, put a hold on the
bill.44    This was a complete surprise.
Coburn had never voiced any objection
to GINA in all the years it had been in
the Senate. In fact, he had even
previously voted for it.  But Coburn
has a well-earned reputation as an
obstructionist.  His Senate nickname
is "Dr. No."45   He has put holds on
more bills than any other Senator.
 We thought at first that Coburn
might be sincerely concerned about
some provision of GINA.  It isn't rare
for a member of Congress to pay little
attention to a bill until it comes close to
passing and then find a problem not
previously noticed.  Kennedy and other
sponsors met with Coburn to ask about
his concern. It turned out he didn't
have any; he was just being an
obstructionist.
gress
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This put Senate majority leader
Harry Reid in a difficult position.  He
could bring the bill up for a vote.  GINA
would pass, but only after Coburn used
every trick in the book to stall.  Instead
of passing in a voice vote that would
allow the Senate to immediately turn
to other important issues, at least a
week of the Senate's time would be
consumed hacking through the
delays.  Time is a precious commodity
in Congress; an extra week spent on
GINA would mean that the Senate
would lose the opportunity to deal with
at least one other important issue.  No
one wanted this. Even Coburn's
Republican colleagues pleaded with
him to remove the hold.  But Coburn
was adamant.
Finally, Reid and Kennedy agreed to
a compromise and Coburn dropped his
hold.  Coburn's pound of flesh was to
change the bill so that employers could
only be sued in their capacity as
employers, not as insurers.  In theory,
Coburn's demand was significant
because most employers act as their
own insurers, at least in part.  They
self-insure the cost of employee health
care up to a point and get a policy from
an insurance company for any amount
over the limit. In practice, however,
few cases will hinge on an employer's
discrimination as an insurer because
if an employer is discriminating as an
insurer, it will usually also be
discriminating as an employer.
Because of this, Reid and Kennedy
agreed to the change to get GINA
passed.
On April 24, 2008, GINA passed the
Senate without dissent.46   On May 21,
President Bush signed it into law.47
Senator Kennedy, a chief sponsor of
the law, has called GINA "the first
civil rights bill of the new century."48
IV.  What GINA Provides
GINA provides protections against
genetic discrimination in the health
insurance and employment settings
and puts additional limitations on the
access to and disclosure of genetic
information.49
A.  Insurance
Title I of GINA prohibits genetic
discrimination in health insurance.50
GINA amends the Employee Retire-
ment Income Security Act (ERISA) to
prohibit group health plans from
increasing premiums based on genetic
information.51   It also amends ERISA
by extending coverage to all group
health plans, no matter how small.52
Unlike many other laws, however,
GINA goes beyond prohibiting dis-
crimination.  It also prohibits health
insurers from obtaining genetic
information.  Insurers are prohibited
from requiring or even requesting an
individual to undergo a genetic test.53
It also prohibits purchasing such
information from third parties.54
GINA takes this step because its
authors recognized the power of
financial incentives. If insurers ac-
quire genetic information, they have a
financial incentive to use it in decision
making. GINA reduces the risk of non-
compliance by keeping the informa-
tion out of insurers' hands.
B.  Employment
Title II of GINA covers employment
and becomes effective eighteen months
from the date of signing.55 GINA is a
common sense law and while any new
federal right of action is an opportu-
nity for litigation, it is unlikely that
GINA will become such a lightening
rod.  The same chorus that has
claimed that such a tidal wave is
likely, has also argued that GINA was
a solution in search of a problem.
These would seem to be contradictory
positions. While there have been a
number of well documented cases of
genetic discrimination and improper
use of genetic information which will
likely grow as we discover more and
more identifiable links between
genetics and disease, few employers
truly want to conduct genetic testing
or have genetic information. As we've
seen with the 34 state laws on genetic
discrimination already in place, there
has been virtually no litigation to date.
GINA does mark a watershed in
American law: the first civil rights law
passed by the Congress that identifies
and outlaws a form of discrimination
before it becomes pervasive and
ingrained in the social fabric.
A discussion of GINA necessarily
requires examining the definition of
genetic information. Generally, a
person's genetic information is that
obtained from the individual's genetic
tests, the individual's family member's
genetic tests, or the individual's
family health history.56   A  genetic test
is a process that analyzes human
DNA, RNA, chromosomes, proteins,
or metabolites, and that detects
genotypes, mutations, or chromo-
somal changes.57  If the test analyzes
proteins or metabolites but does not
detect genotypes, mutations, or chro-
mosomal changes, then it is not
considered a genetic test under
GINA.58 The definition of genetic
information includes "the manifesta-
tion of a disease or disorder in family
members of such individual" because
family medical history could be used to
identify genetic information.59
Sections 202-205 make it unlawful
for an employer, an employment
agency, a labor organization or a joint
labor-management committee con-
trolling job training to "fail or refuse to
hire . . . discharge . . . or otherwise to
discriminate against any employee
with respect to the compensation,
terms, conditions, or privileges of
employment" because of the genetic
information of the employee.60   In this
respect GINA adds genetic informa-
tion as a protected category to the
existing body of federal civil rights
law.
In practice, the sections of GINA
related to acquisition and disclosure of
genetic information will be most
7
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relevant to the current practices of
employers.  Also relevant is that GINA
imposes some modest changes that
will require employers to revise some
standard procedures and take addi-
tional care with others.
Section 202  makes it unlawful  for
an employer to "request, require or
purchase genetic information with
respect to an employee or family
member of an employee . . ."61  Subject
to the exceptions I will discuss below,
this is a total ban that will affect an
employer's ability to access such
information even under circum-
stances where it was previously
authorized under other statutes.
GINA prohibits employers from
requesting genetic information even in
the rare case where it is arguably job
related (though examples to date of
such have been extremely difficult to
demonstrate).62  Nevertheless, in terms
of the ADA, this poses a change to
authorized collection of medical
information relevant to meeting a
reasonable accommodation request.
Employers will need to modify their
requests for medical information
under these circumstances to comply
with GINA.  Similarly, under the ADA
there is virtually no limit to the scope
of medical evaluations after a
conditional offer of employment has
been extended.63 Given that most
individuals' medical files include such
things as family history and may even
have genetic test information, an
employer that requires access to a
large amount of medical information
may run afoul of GINA. Employers
will have to modify their medical
release forms to minimize this risk.
They will have to add language to their
medical release forms that explicitly
states that the person releasing
medical information to the employer
should not release any genetic
information (as defined by the Genetic
Information Non-Discrimination Act).
Workers' compensation laws would
similarly be implicated.  Indeed, it was
a well publicized attempt by Burlington
Northern Railroad to prove an on-the-
job injury was a pre-existing condition
by taking samples of workers for
genetic testing that helped drive GINA
through Congress.64
Section 202 provides six specific
exceptions to the prohibition on
acquisition of genetic information.
The first exception is when an
employer "inadvertently requests or
requires family medical history of the
employee or family member of the
employee."65 This exception applies
only to family medical history, not
genetic information more broadly.
This exception is the most likely to
receive further clarification in the
regulations and may require further
refinement by the courts. While the
chosen terms are somewhat unartful,
it is clear from legislative history that
this first exception is meant to address
so called "water-cooler conversations"
where an employee might voluntarily
offer such information to the em-
ployer.66   There is some disagreement
as to what this language might mean
in situations where the conversation
was directed by the employer with
unintentional consequences.  Cer-
tainly, there is a line where innocent
questions become probing questions.
More likely to be an issue are
situations where the employer re-
quests a large amount of medical
information where it is likely that
genetic information will be a small
part.  It is clear that the intent of the
law is to prohibit such, but more
clarification will be needed.
A second exception applies to
situations where an employer offers
health or genetic services, including a
wellness program.  In such situations
the statute requires the voluntary
consent of the employee and limits
access and disclosure of the informa-
tion obtained.67   Many employers have
adopted wellness programs which
begin with extensive health question-
naires.  At the very least, specific
authorization will need to be obtained
at the onset of the employee's
participation in the program.  What's
unclear is whether such could be made
a condition of participation in the
program.
The third exception applies to the
genetic monitoring of the biological
effects of toxic substances.  Some
employers have programs which
conduct genetic tests of workers in
specific hazardous environments to
determine if they need to be reassigned
before they become symptomatic of
adverse exposure. GINA requires this
testing to be voluntary if not required
by law.68   An employer cannot force an
employee who wants to keep working
in a hazardous area to submit to
testing, though it could likely reassign
the employee so long as the
reassignment did not threaten a high
cost to the employee, thus making
submission to the test involuntary.
 Additional exceptions include infor-
mation required for federal or state
family medical leave statute compli-
ance, information in commercially
and publicly available records (not
including medical databases and court
records), and information required for
law enforcement purposes.69
GINA requires that genetic infor-
mation be kept as part of the
employee's confidential medical
record.70  While it's not required, it
may be good practice to identify
genetic information within the medi-
cal file to ensure that the disclosure
provisions of GINA are fully observed.
GINA prohibits the disclosure of
genetic information unless:
1) there is a written request for
such information from the employee, a
member of a labor organization, or a
family member of the employee (if the
family member is receiving a genetic
service),71
2) a health researcher requests the
information in compliance with
applicable law,72
3) a order requests the information
 IPER REPORT Spring  2009
8
(but only the genetic information that
is specifically authorized and only
with the knowledge of the employee), 73
4) government officials request the
relevant information to enforce GINA,74
5) information is necessary to
comply with federal or state family
medical leave laws,75   or
6) a federal, state, or local public
health agency requests information
regarding a contagious disease or
disorder that poses an imminent
hazard of death or life threatening
illness (but only if the employee is
notified where his family members
will be subject to disclosure of the
information).76
One should note these disclosure
exceptions do not include an exception
for genetic information disclosed in
response to a subpoena or discovery
request.77
Enforcement and remedies in GINA
mirror the ADA.  EEOC exhaustion is
required before a private civil action is
authorized.78    Similarly, the system of
caps for compensatory and punitive
damages is the same and attorneys'
fees are recoverable. Employers with
fifteen or fewer employees are excluded
from coverage, and the amount of a
potential award increases with the size
of the employer to a $300,000
maximum for employers with more
than 500 employees.79     GINA does not
authorize disparate impact claims but
does include a non-retaliation provi-
sion.80
As the regulations process unfolds
we are sure to learn more about the
meaning of GINA.  What is clear now
is that a number of employer activities
and procedures will need to be modified
to  comply and that employers will
need to be even more careful than they
already are in handling employee
medical information. These changes
will unlikely be terribly burdensome
and seem a small price to pay for this
new law that protects us all from
genetic discrimination and is sure to
help unleash the full potential of the
unfolding revolution in Genomic
medicine.
V.  Unsolved Problems
There are issues in GINA that will
only be resolved when the regulations
are complete.  The greatest of these
relates to the breadth of the exclusion
for "incidental" acquisition of genetic
information.  When this concept was
initially raised, the term NWI
suggested was "accidental." The ex-
ception was meant to cover situations
in which the employee spontaneously
revealed information or in which the
employer had asked a question to
which an answer containing genetic
information was completely unforesee-
able.
The term "incidental" could be
interpreted more broadly.  The most
likely scenario where this could be
problematic concerns pre-employment
medical evaluations.  When employers
conduct pre-employment medical
evaluations, a standard part of the
process in reviewing the file from the
applicant's personal physician.  Be-
cause medical records are confidential,
the applicant must sign a consent form
giving the physician permission to
release the file.  Today, employers use
a "blanket" waiver  that authorizes
release of the entire file.
If the regulations are written
properly, employers will be required to
modify their consent forms to exclude
genetic information.  The form should
now say in effect, "Give us the entire
medical record except for any
information that is genetic."  Employ-
ers could argue, however, that genetic
information received in response to a
general request for medical informa-
tion (without knowing that the file
contains genetic information) is
incidental.
This would virtually eliminate
GINA's effect on pre-employment
medical evaluations.  It is critical that
the regulations make clear that
asking a question where it is
foreseeable that the answer will
contain genetic information is not
"incidental."
VI.  Current Challenges
Even if the regulations are perfect,
compliance will be a challenge.
Family medical history, DNA test
results, and other genetic information
are in huge files in no particular place.
To comply with the new consent form,
medical personnel will have to go
through the file one page at a time to
find the pages that can't be disclosed.
It is hard to imagine a busy
physician's office taking the time for
this labor intensive process every time
a routine medical information request
comes in from an employer.
The obvious answer is to make
medical records electronic. This is
something doctors are already begin-
ning to do to make their practices more
efficient.  Software could be developed
that would allow doctors to select
specific types of information from a
patient's complete medical record.
Such software could identify genetic
information and delete it from the
record that is sent to an employer.
Unfortunately, such software does
not yet exist.  The Department of
Health and Human Services proposed
funding the development of this
software.  The proposal went nowhere
under the Bush administration.
Perhaps the Obama administration
will give it a higher priority.
It is also  possible that a market for
such software will develop. Once GINA
goes into effect, employers should
begin to instruct physicians not to
include genetic information in the
medical files they send.  If physicians
follow this instruction, they will spend
a great deal of time sorting out the
records. If they don't follow it, and send
an entire file that includes genetic
information, they have violated their
legal obligation to keep medical
information confidential and patients
could sue them.  This probably won't
9
Spring  2009IPER REPORT
happen if no harm occurs.  But if a
patient loses a job because a physician
disclosed genetic information to an
employer without consent, it may
result in a lawsuit. Either way,
physicians have an economic incentive
to purchase appropriate medical
record software which could lead to its
development.
VII.  The Ones Left Behind
Even if GINA provides perfect
protection for people who carry
disease-linked genes, there is work to
be done.  No one should be denied a job
because of a medical condition that
does not interfere with the ability to
perform it.  Even with GINA and the
ADA, our laws fall short.
The problem lies in requirement for
protection under the ADA, that an
individual  be "disabled."  One need not
be in a wheelchair to be considered
disabled, but the condition must
substantially limit the ability to
perform a major life activity. There
are many medical conditions that
might lead an employer not to hire a
person but are not sufficiently serious
to qualify as disabilities under the
ADA. To achieve real equal opportu-
nity, a person's health should only
affect the ability to get a job if it
interferes with the ability to do it.  We
have a long way to go to reach this goal.
GINA marks an important first
step in allowing Americans to get the
benefits of breakthroughs in genetic
science without creating abuses, but
it's only the beginning of a long road,
whose contours we are only beginning
to see.
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Recent Developments is a regular
feature of The Illinois Public Employee
Relations Report. It highlights recent
legal developments of interest to the
public employment relations commu-
nity. This issue focuses on develop-









In AFSCME, Council 31 and State of
Illinois Department of Corrections,
Case No. S-CA-06-250 (ILRB State
Panel, 2009), the State Panel held
that the employer violated Section
10(a)(1) of the IPLRA.
On September 30, 2005, the
National Labor Relations Board
certified AFSCME as the exclusive
representative of  employees working
at Sheridan Correctional Center
employed by an outside contractor,
providing substance abuse treatment
to inmates.  AFSCME also represented
the Department of Corrections  em-
ployees  at Sheridan.
In May 2005, the union and the
contractor were unable to reach an
agreement. On June 6, 2006, the
contractor’s employees  struck and on
that same day, Sheridan Correctional
Center banned and confiscated all
union-related pins from Sheridan
employees, worn in support of the
strkers.  Some of the confiscated pins
included the message "No Scabs."
The State Panel held that section 6
of the IPLRA, which guarantees public
employees "the right of self-organiza-
tion, [the right to] form, join or assist
any labor organization, [and the right]
to bargain collectively through repre-
sentatives of their own choosing on
questions of wages, hours and other
conditions of employment," is analo-
gous to Section 7 of the National Labor
Relations Act.  Under the IPLRA and
the NLRA, there is a well-established
right of employees to wear union-
related pins and insignia in the
workplace.  The right is balanced
against the employer's right to
manage its operations in an orderly
fashion.
 The State Panel applied NLRB
decisions which establish that "a rule
which curtails that employee right [to
misconduct." While acting as custo-
dian, the employee had used  profanity
towards faculty and students on
several occasions, including one
occasion where he had been given a
three day suspension for such
behavior. While acting as a bus driver,
he had confiscated and destroyed a
student's CD player. After one particu-
lar outburst at a student during lunch,
the custodian was demoted from his
position as head custodian to custodian
and reassigned from the high school to
an elementary school. The superinten-
dent recommended the demotion in
lieu of dismissal. The district's board
of education agreed to the recom-
mended last-chance agreement, with
the addition that the custodian
participate in and successfully com-
plete an anger-management course.
The union filed a grievance challeng-
ing the demotion and advised the
custodian not to sign the last-chance
agreement, and the district termi-
nated the custodian's employment.
The union then filed a grievance
challenging the dismissal.
The arbitrator reinstated the
custodian to his position as custodian,
but not bus driver, with back pay,
except for a ten day suspension.   The
board of education voted not to comply
with the award, and  the union filed
charges with the IELRB.  The IELRB
held  that the district violated sections
14(a)(8) and 14(a)(1) of the IELRA.
The Appellate Court, reversed,
finding that the arbitrator and the
IELRB had given no weight to the
custodian's behavior while acting as a
bus driver. The court found this
omission to be arbitrary and capri-
cious.  The IELRB's review had been
limited to the question of whether the
arbitrator's award violated a public
policy against using profanity in front
of children; it failed to consider the
broader public policy concerning the
safety of school children. The court
remanded the case to the arbitrator to
consider whether reinstatement vio-
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In Central Community Unit School
District No. 4 v. IELRB, 904 N.E. 2d
640 (Ill. App. 4th Dist. 2009). The
Appellate Court for the Fourth District
refused to enforce an arbitratiom
award, which had  reinstated a head
custodian, who also served as a bus
driver. The custodian's position was
subject to the just-cause termination,
and a progressive discipline procedure
that applied except in cases of "gross
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wear union insignia] is presumptively
invalid unless special circumstances
exist which make the rule necessary to
maintain production or discipline, or
to ensure safety." The ILRB found,
that the employer provided no evidence
to support its argument that the "No
Scabs" pins conveyed an inflammatory
message which would be unnecessar-
ily provactive in a prison setting.
Additionally, the State Panel rejected
the employer's assertion that it should
have deferred to the opinion of
correctional professionals in determin-
ing whether the pins were too
inflammatory to be worn in a prison
setting stating.
Supervisors
In Homewood Professinal Firefighters,
Local 3656 and Village of Homewood,
Case No. S-RC-08-067 (IL SLRB,
2009), the State Panel upheld an ALJ's
granting of a representation petition
despite the Village of Homewood's
argument that the petitioned-for
firefighters in the rank of lieutenant
were statutory supervisors.
The village relied on section 3(r) of
the IPLRA which states,  "If there is no
rank between that of chief and the
highest company officer, the employer
may designate a position on each shift
as a Shift Commander, and the
persons occupying those positions
shall be supervisors." The union
asserted that the deputy chief, a
position created by the village fire chief
in 2008, was the next rank between the
chief and the highest company officer.
The ALJ rejected the village's
assertion that to constitute a rank, the
deputy chief position had to be
commissioned or covered by the
Village Board of Police and Fire
Commissioners.  Rather, the ALJ
considered  "whether the title alleged
to be an intervening rank was
recognized by the municipality's
ordinances as being a separate and
distinct time from the lower ranking
position; whether the title was
Weingarten Rights
InPolicemen's Benevolent Labor Com-
mittee and City of Ottawa, Case Nos.
S-CA 04-193, S-CA-04-233 (ILRB State
Panel, 2009), the State Panel reversed
an ALJ decision dismissing an unfair
labor practice charge against the  city
for refusing an employee's request for
union representation at an investiga-
tory interview.  The ILRB concluded
that the employee's Weingarten rights
were violated, even though at the time
of the interview the employee was not
subject to discipline.
On October 21, 2003, Mark
Manicki, a probationary employee,
witnessed a fight between two city
police officers.  Manicki separated the
two officers. Upon learning of the
fight, the city's police chief asked the
Illinois State Police to conduct a
criminal investigation.  After receiv-
ing the State Police's investigatory
report, the police chief conducted an
internal investigation. The investiga-
tors interviewed Manicki, as a witness
to the altercation.  Manicki requested
union representation, which was
denied because Manicki was being
interviewed simply as a witness and
there were no charges against him.
Manicki was interviewed at length
including discussions of the amount of
force Manicki used to end the fight,
conclusion that Manicki was "in-
volved" in the altercation and not
simply an observer; he was a
probationary employee leaving him
"vulnerable to severe discipline for any
policy violations he may have
committed;" and he requested the
presence of union representation at the
interview.
accorded a higher position in the chain
of command; whether a person in the
alleged intervening rank exercised
genuine authority over the lower
ranking firefighters; whether that
authority was reflected in a higher
salary; and whether the alleged
intervening rank was utilized over a
long period of time."  Based on these
factors, the ALJ concluded that the
position of deputy chief, constituted an
intervening rank.  The ILRB upheld
the ALJ's conclusion and use of the
totality of the circumstances test for
determining intervening rank in light
of the "myriad ways in which
intervening ranks may be established"
by a municipality.
The union filed an unfair labor
practice charge protesting the city's
refusal to allow Manicki union
representation at the interview.  The
ALJ dismissed the charge because the
union was unable to demonstrate that
Manicki reasonably believed he might
be disciplined as a result of the
interview.  The State Panel reversed.
In an earlier decision, Morgan and
State of Illinois, 1 PERI 2020 (IL
SLRB 1985), the State Board held that
an employee has a right to union
representation when:  (1) the meeting
between the employee and his
superiors is investigatory, (2) the
employee reasonably believes that
disciplinary action may result and (3)
the employee requests union represen-
tation.
The ILRB concluded that al-
though the interview was investiga-
tory, Manicki did have a reasonable
belief that disciplinary action could
result, which was why he requested
union representation.  The state panel
stated, "It is irrelevant whether
Manicki actually believed disciplinary
action might result," noting the
standard is objective, not subjective,
and viewed in light of all the
circumstances. The circumstances
leading to the belief that Manicki was
subject to discipline included the  city’s
how a computer table broke after
Manicki crashed into it and the
physical and verbal exchanges Manicki
had with one of the officers.
Interviews with other personnel
contradicted Manicki's statement and
as a result, the police department
determined that Manicki falsified his
statement and discharged him.
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